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“There is a need to sustain the doctor-patient relationship 
and then build a new and mutually supportive doctor-
manager relationship if the NHS reforms are to work”.  
Duncan Nichol, Chief Executive of the NHS (Nichol 
1991). 
 
Introduction 
Public Health provision, free at the point of contact, 
is espoused in many countries within the European Union. 
The method of funding, whether by direct taxation, or via 
insurance companies, is not so much a problem as the ever 
increasing cost of medical advances and are. Clearly 
structures need to be in place to manage this service, and 
the modern doctor is called upon to play an ever-
increasing role. The British National Health Service has 
served as a template for our local health service, albeit 
with various divergences along the way. This article 
highlights the central role of the doctor, as leader and 
manager, in effecting constant change within the service.   
 
Leadership: The patient-doctor-management 
relationship 
A successful hospital management can only bring 
about change when its clients, the general public, 
understand and endorse the professed goals of the health 
provider. The doctor plays a pivotal role in the patient-
doctor-manager line of communication and enjoys a 
unique status enabling him or her to effect change. This 
fundamental principle is essential to any hospital 
management strategy and may be applied in various 
structures serving particular hospitals’ needs. The spark 
that ignites change rests with the leader of the medical or 
surgical unit, and the catalyst for progress lies in the 
respect and confidence that he or she gains from patients. 
In a new venture, such as the Maltese Cardiothoracic 
Department, the starting point is necessarily protracted 
and arduous, but positive initial results, timely publicized, 
can feed positively into a doctor-patient population 
relationship that is mutually respectful and dependent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus armed with patient support, the doctor can 
subsequently give direction to the mission of the unit and, 
together with management, implement the changes that 
become necessary.  
The doctor-manager relationship is the other integral 
and essential entity in the implementation of change. 
Cultural differences are at the root of potential conflict.1 
Inappropriate language may amplify traditional fears that 
management would infringe on professional 
independence. Thus terms such as “performance review”, 
and “efficiency” conjure a dread of service curtailment. 
Similarly, describing the patient as a “client” or 
“consumer” transforms the concept of a noble vocation 
into a commercial venture. Managers realize that medical 
advances are relentless, may not fall in line with the 
general needs of the hospital, and inevitably tax resources. 
They face the unenviable task of demonstrating that 
clinical freedom and impulsive actions by consultants 
must be tempered with responsibility for managing these 
finite resources. Doctors are taught to give their patients 
the best possible treatment, irrespective of effort or cost. 
Managers, on the other hand, tend to suppress individual 
interests in their implementation of the organisational 
long-term mission, making optimal use of limited 
resources. Luckily these stereotypes are not widespread, 
and many doctors and managers share a mutual esteem for 
each other’s respective roles. Setting out common goals 
avoids misunderstanding and strengthens the doctor-
management axis within the framework of change. 
Incentives are important when implementing change. 
Thus, efficiency savings are more likely to ensue if they 
are reinvested within the same department. Doctors can 
materially help managers by explaining the impact that 
planned clinical improvement could have on resources. 
Conversely effective lines of communication from 
management can transform a doctor who is simply 
informed of a change to one who actively participates in 
the team bringing about that change. Managers, as leaders, 
must be respected if they are to be followed. Within the 
Public Health Service doctors have been described as the 
best, the brightest, the leaders,2 a concept that was 
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embraced early on in the UK 3 and subsequently at the 
Johns Hopkins Hospital where doctors were actively 
involved in management.4 
Early British National Health Service management 
structures 
The Cogwheel reports5 represented an early attempt 
at management organisation by specialties, involving 
senior and junior medical staff periodically auditing 
services and methods of provision. The first report (1967) 
proposed that Chairs represent their Divisions within the 
Medical Executive Committee, working closely with 
Nursing and Administration.6 The second Cogwheel 
report (1972) was able to report success of this scheme 
with improved communication, a reduction in waiting lists 
and better management of financial resources.7 The third 
report (1974) introduced the concept of District 
Management Teams (DMT) as the principal players 
promoting collaboration between the hospital and 
community services, emphasizing the role of efficiency 
and medical audit.8 In an effort to slim down bureaucracy 
and speed implementation, the doctors’ Executive Teams 
were introduced at hospital level in 1979.9 Further reforms 
in 1982 saw representative consultants and general 
practitioners elected to the DMT’s by their peers.10 
Hospital doctors’ dissatisfaction with this new consensus 
management led to the Griffiths report and the 
recommendation for a “top doctor”, as lobbied for by the 
British Medical association, a position that was embodied 
in the Medical Superintendent prior to 1974.11 The British 
government took the recommendations on board in 1989 
with a concerted effort to involve doctors more 
comprehensively in decision-making and resource 
management, in their policy of “working for patients”.12  
In his book entitled “The National Health Service: a 
political history”, Charles Webster argues that “every 
restructuring intended to make it more efficient made it 
less so”.13 Aneurin Bevan’s mission of a publicly funded 
system through taxation still provided the cheapest option, 
but crisis struck in 1979 after years of under-funding, 
over-management and industrial action.14 The Thatcher 
years saw a concerted effort to limit costs with the 
introduction of prescription charges and the contracting 
out of services. Sadly costs rose relentlessly and the 
public’s perception was overwhelmingly one of service 
cuts. Further policy changes resulted in the fragmentation 
of the NHS, with the introduction of GP fund holders, 
hospital trusts and the internal market. 
Resource management and clinical freedom 
Prior to 1948 doctors and their Superintendents were 
constantly aware of costs, whereas the new breed of NHS 
managers demonstrated less enthusiasm at cost-
containment within a service that was “free” at the point 
of contact.15 Although it was impossible for any advanced 
health service to provide all that was possible, this 
shortfall nevertheless had to be managed. During the first 
30 years of the NHS more was spent every year as 
hospital managers attempted to fund the medical advances 
recommended by doctors. Following these years of plenty, 
1979 was a year of realisation that the traditional methods 
of managing the NHS no longer applied. Cash limits 
dictated that, within an equitable system, each doctor had 
to be accountable for his or her actions, and this was 
partially achieved by involving doctors in resource 
management. Griffiths suggested that doctors’ clinical 
freedom came with managerial responsibility, which 
meant that doctors were formally charged with liability for 
their decisions and were unequivocally accountable to 
their manager.11 This system failed to reach its objectives 
because of indistinct management structures and too hasty 
an implementation.16 Efficiency, as measured by an 
increased output with fixed resources, did not tackle the 
cash shortfall and was not rewarded.  Henceforth the new 
objective would be savings.17 Resource Management was 
a new initiative set up in 1986 that invested more power 
with doctors and nurses, at the same time introducing 
medical audit and benchmarking, comparing outcomes 
between diverse practices.18 Doctors were to fill the new 
posts of Clinical Director (sometimes referred to as 
Clinical Chair), supported by a Business Manager and 
Nurse Manager. Whilst the remit for these new entities 
was comprehensive, including decentralization, 
communication, quality control and evaluation of 
outcomes, in many instances the primary motivation 
appeared to be cost reduction. 
Clinical freedom is at the centre of health care 
provision. It assumes that autonomy in matters of clinical 
judgment and responsibility for patient care is not 
supervised by outside entities.19 Members of the medical 
profession feel that they ought not to be managed by 
others outside their own profession. Politicians and 
managers have sought to curtail this autonomy in their 
quest to reduce costs. Various strategies including 
restructuring and redefining management roles have not 
guaranteed a more efficient health service. The main 
impedance to change is the fact that doctors are 
professionals, they are autonomous, and consequently 
they have not been significantly affected. 
In 1983 Professor Hampton announced the death of 
clinical freedom.20 He argued that the increasing influence 
of evidence-based medicine relegated individual 
practitioners to a subsidiary role in the clinical decision 
process. This view is not widely held in current practice 
where therapeutic options are chosen in the light of meta-
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analyses and economic evaluations performed by bodies 
such as the National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
(NICE).21 Clinicians are encouraged to keep abreast of 
guidelines and to apply them judiciously and 
appropriately to the individual patient who may share 
characteristics with a subset of a particular study 
population. It is just as important for clinicians to take 
heed of guidelines as it is for evidence-based medicine to 
embrace doctors’ judgment, patients’ needs and society’s 
expectations. 
 
Autonomy and management: The early years of the 
Maltese cardiothoracic program. 
Prior to the establishment of the local cardiothoracic 
programme, patients were either sent for treatment to the 
United Kingdom, or were operated on in Malta by visiting 
UK teams. Doctors evaluated their patients for referral to 
foreign specialist units, and civil servants organized the 
travel arrangements for patients and visiting teams. The 
local referring doctors formed part of a board vested with 
the authority to send patients abroad. Decisions were 
corporate and there was no single Clinical Director in 
overall charge. The Hospital Administrator fulfilled the 
functions of a Business Manager and was in charge of 
communications with foreign entities, overseeing all the 
administrative work that made the program possible. 
The established structures were utilized to set up and 
develop the local cardiothoracic programme. Prior to 
April 1995, local nurses travelled to the Northern General 
Hospital, Sheffield to gain work experience. The recently 
appointed local team performed the first forty operations 
in Malta in conjunction with four visiting by teams of 
anaesthetists and nurses from the same Sheffield unit. 
Subsequently the programme was run entirely by local 
staff except for a foreign perfusionist. The Administrator, 
under the direction of the Hospital Superintendent, 
provided all the necessary arrangements for these visits. 
As no Nursing Manager existed at the time, the Chief 
Surgeon collaborated closely with the Hospital Matron, 
both in strategic planning and in the day-to-day running of 
the programme. This nuclear Clinical Management team, 
borne out of necessity, and consisting of the Chief 
Surgeon, Hospital Administrator and the Hospital Matron, 
was the driving force behind the fledgling unit. In many 
ways the success of this team lay in the common goal of 
its participants: that of providing a comprehensive and 
high quality service to local patients without the necessity 
of foreign help.  
 
 
Cost reduction 
The resources that had previously been allocated to 
treating patients abroad were a largely unknown entity. 
The new team quantified this cost and demonstrated 
substantial savings in a financial audit that was drawn up 
after the first years of service. 22  In doing so, the local 
programme fulfilled the goals of corporate responsibility 
as laid out in the Griffiths report, whilst preserving 
clinical freedom. An important goal of cost reduction was 
also achieved.  
Comparing local costs with those in UK centres 
remains an inaccurate exercise. In 1999 Professor DJ 
Wheatly presented the cost of a cardiac surgery package at 
the Glasgow meeting of the Society of Cardiothoracic 
Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland. The figure of 
£7021 (£M4560) for 1997 did not include any profit 
margin, which would be charged to a purchaser 
contracting out services. Health Care Navigator 2000 
quoted the cheapest price for a private coronary bypass 
operation in the UK at £9500 and this yardstick was used 
for comparisons. 23 Yearly financial reports were compiled 
and presented to the health and finance ministers.  During 
the first eight years 2813 cardiac operations were 
performed with estimated savings of £M10.3 million.24 
More recent cost comparisons for coronary surgery 
support our estimations. 25 
A cost-comparison exercise was carried out with UK 
NHS figures derived from information given in 
Parliament by Lord Hunt of King’s Heath in reply to a 
question put forward by Lord Colwyn.26 Trends were 
parallel but the UK cost was more than double the local 
cost (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Cost comparison (UK figures for 2000 and 
2001 not available) 
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Discussion 
The Maltese experience provides a management 
model that may be relevant to other start-up units in 
cardiothoracic surgery. Firstly by nature of its island 
status and high population density the Maltese model is 
relevant to small and medium sized units aspiring to 
function in a sustainable and independent fashion. The 
pillars of this model include a small but effective 
management structure, clinical freedom practiced within 
the constraints of expertise and services, and a mission to 
provide quality treatment in a patient-centred practice.  
Leadership was initially provided by the surgeon and, 
with subsequent expansion of services, morphed into 
progressive tiers of management. Thus the embryonic 
command structure of chief surgeon, hospital 
administrator and matron, directing doctors, nurses and 
paramedics, subsequently lead to one comprising a 
chairman of cardiac services, answerable to a medical 
director, in turn reporting to the hospital chief executive 
officer. Nurses and paramedics, with separate professions 
in their own right, developed independent management 
structures, working alongside doctors, in many instances 
fulfilling roles and responsibilities of nurse practitioners.  
The perceived constraints on clinical freedom were 
repeatedly challenged as diverse services were constantly 
introduced. The validation of this strategy was 
strengthened by public support for the programme 
coupled with the demonstration of substantial economic 
savings when compared with the cost of the previous 
overseas service. An important point of consolidation for 
the programme was the continued follow-up and support 
patients received after their surgical intervention. This 
continuity of care was not possible with an overseas 
visiting programme because of its inherent episodic nature 
and diverse teams. A corollary advantage was that of a 
rapidly growing support base provided by an ever-
increasing cardiac population. 
Clinical freedom translated into an expansion of 
services that would not have been possible within the 
constraints of larger health services. In contrast, the 
rationalisation of transplant units in the UK was driven by 
a perceived need to concentrate expertise within a few 
centres serving large catchment areas.27 This policy not 
only limited the number of units offering this service, but, 
by way of the prevailing philosophy, discouraged any 
visiting team from offering this service to Malta. Soon 
after the establishment of the local programme, cardiac 
transplantation was performed successfully.28 Similarly, 
other procedures that were offered by specialist centres, 
such as mitral valve repair and trans-catheter aortic valve 
implantation, were also performed locally, albeit in small 
numbers.29 These examples illustrate that clinical freedom 
can flourish unabated when the machinery of bureaucratic 
constraint is under-developed. In the setting of an 
organisation such as the British National Health Service 
such diversity of services would not be sanctioned in a 
small unit. 
 
Conclusion 
Local experience supports a philosophy of keeping 
things simple and involving a small team of leaders with a 
common mission. 
Sixty-five years after the establishment of the British 
National Health Service, lively debate and accelerated 
change are relentless. Although tremendous strides have 
been made in the delivery of a modern technological 
medicine, publicly funded health services are creaking 
under the weight of ever-increasing patient expectations in 
an ageing population. Long waiting lists and perceived 
inefficiencies are highlighted when public service 
provision is compared with various fabulously expensive 
private health care systems. Yet global life expectancy has 
increased from 48 years in 1995 to projected a 73 years in 
2025. 30 Let us not underestimate the progress achieved. 
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